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ABSTRACT 
 
The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, 
provides an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is 
capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at 
reasonable cost.  We evaluate one important component of potential climate policy architecture for the 
post-Durban era:  links among independent tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases.  Because 
linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and 
planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist.  We draw on 
recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in 
post-Durban international climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links 
between regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in longer-term, more 
comprehensive bottom-up architecture of direct links.  Although linkage will certainly help to reduce 
long-term abatement costs, it may also serve as an effective mechanism for building institutional and 
political structure to support a future climate agreement. 
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Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture  
Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems 
 
Matthew Ranson and Robert N. Stavins
1 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago, with the signing of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Rio de Janeiro, the nations of the world agreed to launch a process aimed 
at taking action against the risks posed by global climate change.  Some limited progress has been made 
towards that goal:  cap-and-trade systems for greenhouse gases are in place or under development in the 
European Union, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, California, the northeastern United 
States, and several Canadian provinces; Japan and several Chinese cities and provinces are considering 
implementing such systems; and a global emission reduction credit scheme – the Clean Development 
Mechanism – has an important constituency in the world’s developing countries.  However, despite these 
initial steps, international negotiations have not achieved their central objective:  developing a climate 
policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global 
CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost (Posner and Weisbach 2010).   
 
The recent UNFCCC talks in Durban, South Africa, in 2011, provide an important opportunity to 
frame a new approach to this exceptionally difficult global commons problem.  A key product of the 
Durban negotiations is the “Durban Platform for Enhanced Action”, a non-binding agreement that calls 
for a new climate treaty to be reached by 2015 that brings all countries under the same legal regime by 
2020.  Because this agreement departs from the long-standing UNFCCC division of the world’s countries 
into those with serious emissions-reduction responsibilities (the Annex I countries) and those with no 
responsibilities whatsoever, it opens up the negotiation process to new thinking about international 
climate policy architecture.   
 
In this article, we evaluate one important component of international architecture for the post-
Durban era:  links among regional, national, and sub-national tradable permit systems for greenhouse 
gases.  Because linkage allows emitters in high-cost cap-and-trade systems to meet their compliance 
obligations by purchasing allowances or credits from systems with lower marginal abatement costs, it 
reduces the overall cost of achieving a given global emissions target (Jaffe and Stavins 2010).
2  Due to 
this reduction in aggregate costs, there is tremendous interest – indeed pressure – to link existing and 
planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. 
                                                      
1 Ranson was a Ph.D. student in Public Policy at Harvard University when this article was written; he is now a 
Senior Analyst at Abt Associates; Stavins is the Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government at the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, University Fellow of Resources for the Future, and Research 
Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.  Section 2 of the paper draws upon Jaffe, Ranson, and 
Stavins (2009), while Section 4 draws – in part – upon Aldy and Stavins (2012a).  We are grateful for comments we 
received from Blair Beasley, Dallas Burtraw, Denny Ellerman, Robert Hahn, Sheila Olmstead, William Pizer, 
Robert Stowe, Tom Tietenberg, and participants in a workshop held at the University of Chicago Law School.  The 
authors are responsible for all remaining errors. 
 
2 As Metcalf and Weisbach (2012) explain, international links can also be established among national policies (such 
as carbon taxes, performance standards, and technology standards) that do not involve direct trading of emissions 
allowances or credits.  However, as Metcalf and Weisbach (2012) and Hahn and Stavins (1999) argue, such non-
trading links are more challenging; and current political and business interest focuses mainly on linking tradable 
permit systems.  Therefore, our exclusive focus in this paper is on linkage among trading instruments in the wake of 
the Durban Platform.  
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Based on recent political and economic experience with linkage between tradable permit systems, 
we draw several preliminary conclusions about the near-term and long-term roles that linkage may play in 
post-Durban climate policy architecture.  Because the outline of a decentralized system of direct and 
indirect linkages is already emerging, it is possible that in the absence of a top-down international 
agreement, such a collection of linkages will become the de facto near-term architecture for post-Durban 
international climate policy.  Such a system has considerable promise for improving market stability 
while a broader international climate agreement is being negotiated.  However, because direct linkages 
are currently planned only between systems in highly developed nations, and because most cap-and-trade 
systems have placed limits on the use of emissions reduction credits (which allow access to inexpensive 
abatement opportunities in developing countries), the near-term cost savings from this ad hoc system of 
links may be modest.  Nonetheless, this system of linkages could still play an important near-term role by 
providing the institutional and political foundation for a future climate architecture.  Additionally, in the 
longer term, linkage could provide substantial cost savings while serving as either the decentralized 
framework for an organic, bottom-up architecture, or as a component of a larger top-down climate 
architecture. 
2  THEORY OF LINKAGE 
We begin by describing different types of international linkages and explaining how these can 
affect policy considerations such as cost effectiveness, distribution of cost burdens, and national 
sovereignty and control.
3 
2.1 TYPES OF LINKAGE 
The economic and environmental effects of linking different systems depend on the form of the 
link.  One key distinction is between direct and indirect linkage (Jaffe, Ranson, and Stavins 2009).   
2.1.1  DIRECT LINKAGE 
Direct linkage between two systems occurs when one or both systems allow regulated entities to 
meet their compliance obligations by surrendering allowances or credits obtained from the other system.  
These direct links can be two-way (bilateral or multilateral) or one-way (unilateral). 
 
Two-way direct linkage occurs when two cap-and-trade systems choose to recognize each other’s 
allowances.  Because of the arbitrage opportunity posed by different allowance prices, regulated entities 
in the system with the higher allowance price will purchase allowances from the lower price system.  As a 
result, emissions in the higher price system will increase, but emissions from the lower price system will 
decrease by the same amount.  This flow of allowances will cause allowance prices to increase in the 
lower price system and to decrease in the higher price system until – in principle – they converge to a 
common intermediate price. 
 
One-way direct linkage occurs when a cap-and-trade (CAT) system recognizes credits from an 
emissions-reduction-credit (ERC) system
4 or from another CAT system.  In the former case, if the price 
of allowances is higher than the price of credits, then regulated entities in the CAT system have an 
incentive to purchase credits. This will increase the price of credits and reduce the price of allowances, 
                                                      
3 Jaffe, Ranson, and Stavins (2009) present a more comprehensive treatment of the theory of linkage. 
 
4 An ERC system awards saleable credits to firms which implement voluntary projects that reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions relative to what emissions would have been under a counterfactual business-as-usual scenario.  A 
prominent example of an ERC system is the Clean Development Mechanism, described below in Section 3.  
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leading prices in the two systems to converge.  However, if the initial allowance price is lower than the 
credit price, then CAT participants will not have any reason to purchase credits, and the one-way link will 
have no effect on prices or the distribution of emissions.  Thus, a one-way link between a cap-and-trade 
system and a credit system ensures that the CAT system’s allowance price never exceeds the price of 
credits. 
 
One-way direct linkage can also occur when one CAT system recognizes allowances from a 
different CAT system.  As in the case described above, this type of one-way linkage ensures that 
allowance prices in the first CAT system never exceed allowance prices in the CAT system whose 
allowances it recognizes.   
 
Governments may place limits on inter-system trading that prevent full convergence of allowance 
prices.  For example, a government may limit the quantity of external allowances that can be used to 
demonstrate compliance in its own system.  Alternatively, an “exchange rate” may be applied to the price 
of allowances or credits from other systems.  Such a requirement might be used to reduce inter-system 
trading or to ensure that trading with other systems leads to a net reduction in emissions. 
2.1.2  INDIRECT LINKAGES 
Indirect linkages occur when two systems link directly to a common third system.  Even though 
neither system directly links to the other, the indirect linkage created by trading with the common system 
allows differences in the supply and demand for allowances to propagate between the original two 
systems. 
 
An important type of indirect linkage occurs when two cap-and-trade systems both create direct 
one-way links to the same ERC system.  As a result of these links, entities in the two CAT systems will 
compete for the ERC system’s credits.  If the price of credits is lower than the price of allowances in both 
systems, then this indirect linkage can lead prices in all three systems to converge.  As a result, 
developments in the market in one of the CAT systems can affect the allowance price and emissions level 
in the other CAT system. 
 
A series of bilateral (two-way) linkages between several CAT systems will also result in indirect 
linkage.  Such a system will have the same effects as direct multilateral linkage among all of the systems.  
For example, if System A has a two-way link with System B, which has a two-way link with System C, 
then trading will – again, in principle – lead allowance prices to converge across all three systems, despite 
the fact that A and C are not directly linked. 
2.2 IMPLICATIONS OF LINKING 
Linkage can affect overall cost-effectiveness, the distribution of economic impacts, national 
control over policy design, and the incentives that nations face in setting domestic emissions reduction 
targets.  Each of these factors has implications for the role that linkage may play in a post-Durban 
international policy architecture (Jaffe, Ranson, and Stavins 2009).  
2.2.1  COST EFFECTIVENESS 
The most important benefit of linkage is to lower the aggregate costs of emissions reductions by 
allowing firms in high-cost systems to pay for less expensive abatement opportunities in lower-cost 
systems.  The improvement in cost-effectiveness will be greatest when the two systems face very different 
marginal abatement costs.  Furthermore, by enlarging the scope of the relevant market, linking can 
improve market liquidity, reduce volatility in prices, and lessen concerns about market power.   
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However, linkage can also have detrimental effects on the effectiveness of domestic climate 
policies.  A key concern is the problem of “additionality”:  whether purchasing credits from an emissions-
reduction-credit system truly reduces overall emissions.  This problem arises from the difficulty of 
defining a counterfactual baseline against which to measure the effects of projects intended to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.  If linkage allows regulated firms in a cap-and-trade system to purchase ERC 
credits from emissions reduction projects that would have occurred anyway, then linkage may actually 
cause aggregate emissions to increase (or to decrease less than they otherwise would have). 
2.2.2  DISTRIBUTION OF POLICY IMPACTS 
Linkage can also change the distributional impacts of GHG policies on regulated firms and the 
consumers that they serve.  Whether a firm benefits or suffers from a new link depends on:  (1) whether 
the firm is a net seller or net buyer of allowances, and (2) whether the firm is located in the higher or 
lower price system.  For example, after a link to a system with a higher price, net sellers in the lower-
price system will benefit from the opportunity to sell more allowances, and to sell them at the higher post-
linkage price.  However, net buyers in the lower-price system will have to pay a higher price after linking, 
making them worse off.  Thus, although linkage improves aggregate welfare in both systems, it can also 
create individual winners and losers in both systems.    
 
The distributional effects of linkage also depend on the type of systems that are linked.  For 
example, the creation of a one-way link between a cap-and-trade system and an emission-reduction-credit 
system can only benefit participants in the credit system, since these participants do not face mandatory 
emissions targets and thus can only benefit from the opportunity to sell emissions credits at higher prices.  
Hence, there is unanimous and enthusiastic support for the Clean Development Mechanism from the 
UNFCCC’s non-Annex I countries. 
2.2.3  NATIONAL CONTROL 
Because linkage exposes a domestic system to the design features and market developments of 
any system to which it is linked, linkage can reduce national control over the economic and 
environmental impacts of domestic climate change policies.  However, the degree to which domestic 
systems lose control depends on whether links are two-way or one-way.  For example, cost-containment 
measures—such as banking, borrowing, offsets, or safety-valve provisions—will propagate completely 
across a two-way link between two cap-and-trade systems.  In contrast, under a one-way linkage, cost-
containment measures will propagate only to the system that accepts the other’s allowances.
5 
2.2.4  INCENTIVES FOR SETTING CAPS 
An additional concern about linkage is that it changes the incentives that jurisdictions face when 
setting their respective emissions caps (Helm 2003).  Because a link can affect the allowance price within 
a linked jurisdiction, it can alter the fundamental tradeoff a government faces between the value it can 
create by issuing additional allowances and the marginal environmental damage that can arise from 
issuing such allowances.  By expanding the scope of the allowance market, linkage can reduce the impact 
that the issuance of additional allowances has on allowance prices, and therefore on the value of existing 
allowances.  Further, by allowing nations with high domestic emission reduction costs to purchase less 
expensive emission reductions from other systems, linking can reduce the costs that such nations would 
face in committing to more stringent caps, thereby partially offsetting some of these effects. 
 
For example, when a small cap-and-trade system establishes a direct link with a larger cap-and-
trade system, the administrator of the smaller system may be tempted to issue a larger number of 
                                                      
5 Technically speaking, some price effects of cost-containment measures do propagate in both directions of a one-
way linkage, via supply and demand effects in the linking and target systems.   
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allowances into order to raise government revenues or benefit domestic firms.  Alternatively, linkage to 
the larger allowance market may allow the smaller system to tighten its cap dramatically, achieving its 
targets by displacing costs onto foreign firms in the linked system. 
3  CHARACTERISTICS OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED LINKAGES 
Despite the hiatus in the United States of serious consideration of a national CO2 cap-and-trade 
system, such systems are in place or under development in the European Union, Switzerland, Australia, 
New Zealand, South Korea, California, the northeastern United States, and several Canadian provinces, 
and are under consideration in Japan and parts of China.  Additionally, a global emission reduction credit 
scheme (the Clean Development Mechanism) has an important constituency of supporters in the world’s 
developing countries.  In this section, we review these systems and describe existing and proposed links 
among them. 
3.1  LINKAGE AMONG EXISTING TRADING SYSTEMS 
Because governments face strong economic and political incentives to link to other systems, there 
are already a number of links established or proposed between existing tradable GHG (mostly CO2) 
permit systems. 
3.1.1  EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER ARTICLE 17 OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, each Annex I country took on a quantitative emissions target for the 
2008-2012 compliance period.  These emissions targets are expressed in Assigned Amount Units 
(AAUs).  Under Article 17 of the Protocol, AAUs may be bought and sold by national governments, with 
the condition that each government must have a sufficient number of AAUs at the end of the compliance 
period to cover its actual emissions (United Nations 1998, at 3(10)).  When two governments exchange 
AAUs, they create an implicit link between their domestic climate policies. 
 
An important obstacle to the successful operation of such a system is that by its very nature, the 
trading is among nations (Hahn and Stavins 1999).  Unlike private firms, nation-states are not simple 
cost-minimizers, and so there is no reason to anticipate that competitive pressures will lead to equating of 
marginal abatement costs across countries.  Furthermore, even if nations did try to minimize costs, they 
would not have sufficient information about the marginal abatement costs of domestic firms to define 
their own national aggregate marginal cost functions. Thus, such a system does not have the cost-
effectiveness property ordinarily associated with tradable permit system among firms, and the notion of 
linkage via trading between countries may be more of a metaphor than a practical policy.  To date, sales 
of AAUs have been modest relative to sales of other types of credits (Reuters 2011; U.S. Energy 
Information Administration 2011). 
3.1.2  CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the world’s largest emission-
reduction-credit system.  Under the CDM, firms and other entities in non-Annex I (developing) countries 
can be awarded certified emission reduction (CER) credits for conducting voluntary projects that reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.  These projects can take a variety of possible forms, such as building new wind 
farms, installing more energy efficient equipment in manufacturing facilities, or capturing methane from 
landfills.  CERs can then be purchased by regulated emitters in Annex I counties for use in meeting their 
domestic emissions commitments.  CERs could also be used for entities covered by cap-and-trade 
systems in countries that are not Parties to the Protocol (in particular, the United States).   
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From the perspective of the developing countries, the CDM provides a mechanism for financing 
“sustainable development.”  From the perspective of the industrialized countries, the CDM provides a 
means to engage developing countries in the control of GHG emissions while simultaneously reducing 
the costs of achieving domestic emissions targets.  Because it tends to be much less expensive to 
construct new low-carbon energy infrastructure in developing nations than to modify or replace existing 
infrastructure in industrialized countries (Wara, 2007), international trading in CERs could significantly 
reduce the aggregate cost of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
A number of cap-and-trade programs explicitly allow the use of CDM credits, including existing 
systems in the European Union, Switzerland, and New Zealand, as well as a future system in Australia 
(see below).  Most CDM projects have been funded by European parties:  investors in the United 
Kingdom have sponsored 30% of all CDM projects, Swiss investors have sponsored 20%, Japanese 
investors 10%, Dutch 10%, Swedish 7%, and German 4% (UNFCCC 2012a). 
 
The CDM has accounted for annual CO2-equivalent reductions of 278 million tons, about 1 
percent of annual global emissions of CO2 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011).
6  The largest 
shares of CERs have been generated in China (52%) and India (16%), with Latin America and the 
Caribbean making up another 15% of the total, Brazil (at 7%) being the largest CER producer in that 
region (World Bank, 2010).  Of the CERs expected to be generated by projects in the CDM pipeline by 
2012, 35% are for renewables, 28% are for HFC and NO2 reduction, 20% are for methane reduction, and 
the remaining 18% are for electricity generation, fuel switching, and other projects.
7 
 
As an emission-reduction-credit (ERC) system, the CDM raises important concerns about 
additionality, i.e., the problem of whether basing credits on an unobservable hypothetical baseline leads to 
credits being granted for emission reductions that would have occurred in any case.  Empirical analysis 
has validated these concerns, with estimates that up to 75% of claimed reductions would have occurred in 
the absence of the program (Zhang and Wang 2011).   
 
An additional concern has centered on the fact that nearly 30% of average annual CERs have 
come from the destruction of HFC-23, a potent GHG that is a by-product of the manufacture of certain 
refrigerant gases.  It is very inexpensive to destroy HFC-23, and companies can earn nearly twice as much 
from the sale of CDM credits as they can from selling respective refrigerant gases (Wara, 2007).  As a 
result, it has been argued that plants were being built simply for the purpose of generating CERs from 
destruction of HFC-23.  Because of this, beginning in 2013, CERs from HFC-23 destruction will not be 
valid for purposes of compliance with the EU ETS (see below). 
 
As negotiations continue regarding the details of a second commitment period for the Kyoto 
Protocol, the CDM will most likely continue to function in any case (Bodansky 2011).  However, a 
variety of proposals have been put forward to improve its structure and implementation, many targeted at 
increasing the additionality of approved projects (Hall, Levi, Pizer, and Ueno 2010).  There have also 
been discussions of alternative mechanisms for engaging developing countries, such as “New Market 
Mechanisms” for sectoral crediting. 
3.1.3  JOINT IMPLEMENTATION 
Joint Implementation (JI) is another Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanism.  It allows entities in 
Annex I countries to generate and sell offset credits—known as Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)—to  
one another (Aldy and Stavins 2012b).  Like the CDM, JI is a project-based ERC system whose credits 
                                                      
6 Note that carbon sequestration projects of forestation and reduced deforestation are not included in the CDM under 
the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period, 2008-2012. 
 
7 See http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm.  
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raise concerns about additionality, although the concerns are somewhat different since countries that can 
participate in JI projects have caps under the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
The market for ERUs has been less robust than the market for CERs.  As of April, 2012, host 
countries had issued 131 million ERUs.  Of the 542 approved projects, 163 were based in Ukraine, 144 in 
Russia, 59 in the Czech Republic, 39 in Bulgaria, and 25 in Poland, with the remainder primarily in 
Europe (UNEP Risoe Centre 2012).  
3.1.4  EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is a downstream CO2 cap-and-trade 
system that is by far the world’s largest carbon pricing regime (European Commission 2012a).  This 
system, which was adopted in 2003, covers about half of CO2 emissions from thirty European countries.
8  
The EU ETS has been implemented in phases:  a first (pilot) phase from 2005 to 2007, a second (Kyoto) 
phase from 2008 to 2012, and a scheduled third phase from 2013 to 2020.  Although the first phase 
allowed trading only in carbon dioxide, the second phase broadened the program to include some other 
GHGs from certain industrial sectors, such as nitrous oxide emissions from nitric acid production. The 
11,500 regulated sources include large sources such as oil refineries, combustion installations over 20 
MWth, coke ovens, cement factories, and pulp and paper producers (Ellerman and Buchner 2007).   
Although EU ETS allowance prices averaged €22 in the second half of 2008, prices had fallen to €7 in 
2012 as the economic recession brought reduced economic activity and decreased demand for 
allowances.
9 
 
The European Commission’s Linking Directive allowed EU ETS participants to use CERs from 
the Clean Development Mechanism beginning in 2005 and ERUs from the Joint Implementation program 
beginning in 2008, although certain types of projects, such as land use change, forestry, and nuclear 
power, have not been eligible for credits (European Parliament 2004, p.18; European Commission 2005, 
p.17), and industrial gas destruction projects will cease to be eligible after 2013 (European Commission, 
2011b).  Because of these links, CER and ERU prices are heavily dependent on EU ETS allowance 
prices.
10   
 
During the first and second trading periods, EU ETS member nations each set national limits on 
the use of credits as a percentage of total allowances, with limits ranging from 0 percent in Estonia to 20 
percent in Lithuania and Spain (European Commission 2007c, p.2).  In future trading periods, the 
European Commission has mandated that no more than half of the EU ETS overall emissions reductions 
target may be achieved through credits.  Furthermore, for projects initiated in 2013 or later, the EU ETS 
will recognize CERs only from nations on the U.N.’s list of Least Developed Countries (most of which 
are in Africa), thereby eliminating projects from the countries that currently dominate the supply, most 
notably, China and India.  CERs flowing from projects begun prior to 2013 in more developed non-
Annex I countries will continue to be allowed (European Commission 2011a). 
 
                                                      
8 The EU ETS covers all 27 EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.  Iceland, Liechtenstein, and 
Norway joined the EU ETS in 2008, although sources in Iceland are not yet subject to an emissions cap. 
 
9 In addition, a set of “complementary policies,” such as those aimed at increasing the use of renewable sources of 
energy, have had the effect of reducing emissions in one sector only to see them increase in other sectors, under the 
EU ETS umbrella, thereby accomplishing no additional net emissions reductions, but increasing aggregate costs 
(decreasing cost effectiveness) by maintaining heterogeneous marginal abatement costs, and reducing allowance 
prices in the EU ETS. 
 
10 See, for example:  CarbonPositive (2007, 2008); Point Carbon Advisory Services (2007, p.3-4). 
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To some degree, the EU ETS can itself be viewed as a large multilateral linkage among its 
member counties, in which each country recognizes allowances issued by all other members (Ellerman 
2010, p.1).  This was particularly true in the first and second trading periods, during which each country 
proposed its own individual emissions cap for review by the European Commission (Kruger, Oates, and 
Pizer 2007, p.115-116).  This created incentives for individual countries to try to be generous with their 
allowances to protect their economic competitiveness (Convery and Redmond 2007).  Not surprisingly, 
the result was an aggregate cap that — at least in Phase I — exceeded business-as-usual emissions.
11  
However, for future trading periods, caps have been determined through a more centralized process at the 
EU level (European Parliament 2009; European Commission 2012b). 
3.1.5  NORWEGIAN EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 
From 2005 to 2007, Norway operated an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which covered 10 to 
15 percent of national CO2 emissions and imposed a cap equal to 95 percent of 1998-2001 levels.
12  The 
system included a one-way linkage with the EU ETS, which allowed Norwegian firms to meet their 
compliance obligations by purchasing emissions permits from the EU ETS (Bruvoll and Dalen 2009, 
p.18).  In 2007, the three non-EU member countries of the European Economic Area — Norway, Iceland, 
and Liechtenstein — joined the EU ETS through the adoption of  the EU ETS Directive (2003/87/EC as 
amended) into the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement (European Commission 2007b; Norway 
Ministry of the Environment 2009, p.36-37).
13  With this agreement, Norway and the other EEA members 
agreed to follow the same process for setting national caps as the EU member states. 
3.1.6  SWISS CO2 ACT 
Since 2008, Switzerland has operated a quasi-voluntary cap-and-trade system based on the 
authority of its CO2 Act.  Under this program, companies can be granted exemption from a mandatory 
CO2 tax on fossil fuels in exchange for taking on a legal commitment under the cap-and-trade system 
(Mace et al. 2008, p.7-8).  Under the Swiss system, companies may meet up to eight percent of their 
emissions targets using CDM and JI credits (Swiss FOEN 2007).  Although Swiss and EU participants 
cannot currently use each other’s allowances, the Swiss government has begun negotiations with the 
European Commission to create a link between the Swiss trading program and the EU ETS, mostly likely 
starting in 2014 (Council of the European Union 2010; PointCarbon 2012b). 
3.1.7  NEW ZEALAND EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 
In January, 2008, the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) was launched.  The 
forestry sector entered the program first, in 2008, and stationary energy, industrial, and liquid fuel fossil 
fuel sectors joined in 2010.   Early evidence suggests that the forestry component has deterred 
deforestation, although international policy and consequent price uncertainty are major problems for 
investment (Karpas and Kerr 2011).  The waste (landfills) sector is scheduled to enter in 2013, and 
agriculture – which accounts for nearly half of New Zealand’s gross emissions – is scheduled to enter in 
2015.
14  Thus, the intention of the system is to include all sectors of the economy and all greenhouse gases 
by 2015 (Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel 2011, p.6).  The NZ ETS features free allocation of 
allowances, with special protections (output-based updating allocations) for emission-intensive, trade-
                                                      
11 Due to a variety of factors, including the economic recession and the ability of regulated entities to bank 
allowances into Phase III, it is difficult to assess the system’s performance in Phase II. 
 
12 The Norwegian ETS was designed to be compatible with the EU ETS (Mace et al. 2008, p.6). 
 
13 Iceland and Liechtenstein did not previously have cap-and-trade systems. 
 
14 See:  http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/ 
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sensitive sectors, as well as a safety valve that allows participants to meet their obligations by paying a 
fee of NZ$25 per ton (Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel 2011, p.6; New Zealand Parliament 
2011, at 222C).  Additionally, a recent five-year government review recommended that the agriculture 
sector face a lower price as it enters the system (Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel 2011). 
 
Currently, the NZ ETS allows participants to use an unlimited number of credits from the CDM 
and JI programs, as well as AAU allowances converted from other UNFCCC signatories (NZ Ministry for 
the Environment 2007, p.46-48).  However, certain categories of offset credits are not eligible, such as 
those based on HFC-23 and NO2 industrial gas destruction (NZ Ministry for the Environment 2012).  The  
ETS also includes several features intended to protect participants from the potential price effects of 
international demand for its allowances (known as New Zealand Units, or NZUs).  The establishing 
legislation prohibits export of NZUs if the total number of NZUs held within the country falls below 90 
percent of the initial allocation for that trading period.  Additionally, in response to the recession, in 2009 
the New Zealand government prohibited participants in all sectors except forestry from exporting any 
allowances until 2013 (New Zealand Parliament 2011, at 17,222G). 
 
  Some features of the New Zealand ETS, particularly the way that allowances are allocated, were 
chosen for compatibility with Australia’s previously proposed Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
(CPRS).  Although the CPRS never became law, the possibility of linking to a future Australian system 
was — and is — an important consideration for the New Zealand ETS, especially in light of the close 
trade relationship between the two countries (ETS Review Panel 2011, p.28).  In 2011, the New Zealand 
government announced plans to establish a two-way linkage with Australia’s forthcoming emissions 
trading program (Australia’s 2011 Clean Energy Act; see discussion below), beginning in 2015 (Combet 
and Groser 2011).  The details of this linkage have not yet been finalized. 
 
Establishing a direct linkage between the New Zealand ETS and the EU ETS poses greater 
challenges.  Because forest sink credits are a major part of the New Zealand ETS but are not allowed by 
the EU ETS, the creation of a direct link between the two systems is unlikely in the near future (New 
Zealand Herald 2011).  However, as a result of its direct link to the CDM, the New Zealand ETS does 
have an indirect linkage to the EU ETS.  Because non-forestry New Zealand sources are required to 
surrender only one allowance per two units of emissions until 2013, the current effective price of NZ 
allowances is very low. 
3.1.8  REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a downstream cap-and-trade program that 
limits CO2 emissions from power sector sources in nine northeastern U.S. states (Connecticut, Delaware, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont).
15  Like the 
EU ETS, RGGI can be envisioned – to some degree – as a linked set of state-level cap-and-trade 
programs.  
 
The system is both narrow in its sectoral coverage and unambitious in terms of its emissions 
reduction objectives.  RGGI took effect in 2009, after approval by individual state legislatures, and set a 
goal of lowering emissions to 10 percent below 2009 levels by 2019.  It was originally anticipated that 
meeting this goal would require a reduction of approximately 35 percent below business-as-usual 
emissions levels.  However, due the combined effects of the economic recession and drastic declines in 
natural gas prices relative to coal prices, the cap is no longer binding and is unlikely to become binding 
                                                      
15 In May of 2011, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie announced that his state would withdraw from the system. 
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through 2020, unless the cap trajectory is adjusted (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 2010a; Aldy and 
Stavins 2012b).
16 
 
The Model Rule governing RGGI’s implementation allows for two types of one-way linkages.  
First, covered sources may meet up to 3.3 percent of their compliance obligations using allowances 
generated by certain types of offset CO2 projects located in one of the RGGI states, or in another U.S. 
jurisdiction that has completed a memorandum of understanding with the RGGI states (Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative 2007, p.63,105).
17  The 3.3 percent limitation was chosen so that no more than 
half of all emissions reductions between 2009 and 2020, relative to projected baseline emissions at the 
time the Model Rule was written, would be achieved using offsets (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
2006a).  To address uncertainty about future abatement costs, the rule includes price triggers that allow 
greater use of offsets if average annual allowance prices exceed certain thresholds.  If the price exceeds 
$7 (in 2005$), sources may use offsets for up to 5 percent of their compliance obligations, and if the price 
exceeds a “stage two threshold price” that begins at $10 in 2005 and increases by about 2 percent each 
subsequent year, then sources may use offsets for up to 10 percent of their compliance obligations 
(Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 2007, p.17-18,63). 
 
The second type of linkage allowed by RGGI is one-way linkage to other international CAT and 
ERC systems.  If annual allowance prices exceed the “stage two threshold price”, then RGGI sources may 
satisfy their compliance obligations using CERs from UNFCCC emission-reduction-credit programs or 
allowances from any other cap-and-trade system outside the United States (Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative 2007, p.105-106). 
 
As of the spring of 2012, no applications for approval for offset projects have ever been 
submitted to RGGI (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative CO2 Allowance Tracking System 2012a), 
because of the low RGGI allowance price (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 2010b; Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative CO2 Allowance Tracking System 2012b).  Furthermore, because RGGI prices 
have remained far below the $10 stage two threshold price, RGGI sources have never been permitted to 
use CERs or other CAT systems’ allowances. 
3.2 POSSIBLE LINKAGE AMONG FUTURE TRADING SYSTEMS 
Several new cap-and-trade systems will come into effect in the near future.  Although details of 
these systems remain to be determined through promulgation of specific regulations, the respective 
authorizing legislation provides insights into the likely future role of linkage in each system.
18 
3.2.1  AUSTRALIA’S CLEAN ENERGY ACT OF 2011 
In 2011, Australia’s government passed its Clean Energy Act, which imposes a carbon tax of 
approximately AUD$25/ton for the period from 2012 to 2015, after which the tax is to be replaced by a 
cap-and-trade system (Australian Clean Energy Act 2011, at 100).  The Act includes a number of features 
                                                      
16 Allowance prices have reflected these realities, falling from approximately $3 per ton of CO2 at the first auction in 
September, 2008, to the floor price of $1.93 per ton in 2012 (RGGI COATS, 2012b).  In response, RGGI states are 
considering lowering the emissions cap for the 2014 to 2020 period (PointCarbon, 2012a). 
 
17 The Revised Memorandum of Understanding between the RGGI states also allows offset credits from non-RGGI 
U.S. states with cap-and-trade systems (RGGI 2006b, p.2).  However, this provision was not included in the Model 
Rule that serves as the basis for the state regulations.  
 
18 We exclude some systems from our analysis.  As of early 2012, British Columbia, Manitoba, and Ontario have not 
yet finalized cap-and-trade regulations.  
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directed at possible linkage with other systems.  Import and export of allowances is allowed (Australian 
Clean Energy Act 2011, at 108,109), although the government may set charges on international 
allowances and credits of up to AUD$15 in 2015, AUD$16 in 2016, and AUD$17.05 in 2017 (Australian 
Clean Energy International Unit Surrender Charge Act 2011, at 8).   
 
Furthermore, the government is tasked specifically with developing regulations on the use of 
foreign allowances that take into account Australia’s international objectives and obligations, the 
environmental integrity of Australia’s system, and “the extent to which eligible international emissions 
units may be surrendered, accepted or used for the purposes of: (i) the Climate Change Response Act 
2002 of New Zealand; or (ii) the European Union emissions trading scheme” (Australian Clean Energy 
Act 2011, at 123).  As discussed above, Australia and New Zealand have announced plans to link their 
trading systems beginning in 2015, once Australia’s carbon tax converts to a cap-and-trade system 
(Combet and Grocer 2011).  Additionally, Australian and European Commission officials have begun 
negotiations to consider how Australia’s system might be linked to the EU ETS (Combet 2012).   
3.2.2  CALIFORNIA'S GLOBAL WARMING SOLUTIONS ACT OF 2006 
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 directed the California Air Resources Board 
(CARB) to promulgate regulations to achieve the goal of reducing the state’s greenhouse gas emissions to 
1990 levels by the year 2020, a very ambitious target by North American standards.  In 2011, CARB 
finalized a rule that establishes a cap-and-trade system as the primary mechanism by which the state will 
achieve this goal, beginning in 2013 (California Air Resources Board 2011).  The regulation includes 
several cost-containment measures, including banking of allowances and a strategic allowance reserve, as 
well as allowing for linkage to other systems (California Air Resource Board 2011).   
 
Two types of links are allowed by current regulations governing the cap-and-trade system.  First, 
facilities may use offsets (of any approved type) for up to eight percent of their compliance obligations 
(California Code of Regulations 10-5, at 95854).  Initially, credit will only be given for offsets from U.S. 
based projects involving forestry, dairy digesters, and destruction of ozone-depleting substances.   
However, the regulations create a framework for possible future linkage to CDM, JI, and other 
international ERC programs (California Air Resources Board 2011), and California has completed a joint 
memorandum of understanding with Chiapas, Mexico, and Acre, Brazil, that could allow the use of 
avoided deforestation offsets from these two states as soon as 2015 (Morris, Richardson, and Riddle 
2011).  Second, the regulations allow for unrestricted use of allowances from directly linked cap-and-
trade systems (California Code of Regulations 10-5, at 95821,95941-95942).  In March, 2012, regulations 
were proposed that would create a two-way direct link with Quebec’s cap-and-trade system, although this 
linkage was delayed by a legislative subcommittee in 2012 (California Air Resources Board 2012, at 
95943; PointCarbon 2012c).  Links with other U.S. states and Canadian provinces may come later via the 
Western Climate Initiative.
19 
3.2.3  QUEBEC’S CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM 
In 2011, the Quebec government adopted regulations establishing a cap-and-trade system for 
industrial facilities emitting more than 25,000 tons of CO2 per year (Quebec Office of the Minister of 
Sustainable Development, Environment, and Parks 2011).  This system, which will begin capping 
emissions starting in 2013, is explicitly based on design criteria established by the Western Climate 
Initiative (Emissions Trading Association 2012, p.1).  Indeed, the regulation allows for linkage with other 
cap-and-trade systems with which the government of Quebec has concluded an agreement, and Quebec 
                                                      
19 The Western Climate Initiative originally was to include eleven western U.S. states and Canadian provinces, and 
now is likely to begin with California, Ontario, and Quebec, which are contemplating linking their developing 
state/provincial CO2 cap-and-trade systems beginning in 2013. 
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plans to link to California’s cap-and-trade system (Quebec Government 2011, at I.III.37).  However, the 
Quebec system restricts facilities from using domestic offsets to cover more than eight percent of their 
emissions, and does not currently allow linking with international sources of offset credits, such as the 
CDM (Quebec Government 2011, at I.III.20(5), I.III.37; International Emissions Trading Association 
2012a, p.11).   
3.2.4  CHINA’S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM PILOTS 
In late 2010, the Chinese government released its Twelfth Five-Year-Plan, which calls for the 
establishment of a national carbon emission trading system by 2015.  The government  has begun work to 
establish pilot cap-and-trade programs in the cities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, and 
Shenzhen, and the provinces of Hubei and Guangdong, by 2013 or 2014 (Han et al. 2012).  Because the 
basic characteristics of these pilot systems (such as whether they will be mandatory or voluntary, whether 
the caps will be absolute or intensity-based, and what industries will be included) remain to be determined 
(Petherick 2012), it is not clear whether or how these trading programs might link to other cap-and-trade 
or credit systems.   
3.2.5  SOUTH KOREA’S CAP AND TRADE SYSTEM 
In May of 2012, South Korea’s parliament voted to establish a cap-and-trade program that will 
take effect in 2015.  The program will apply to companies whose annual emissions are greater than 
125,000 metrics tons of CO2, as well as some smaller factories, buildings, and livestock producers 
(Bloomberg 2012).  The government has not yet promulgated regulations governing offsets or linkage to 
other systems. 
3.2.6  AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009 
In 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act 
(also known as the Waxman-Markey Bill), which would have established a national CO2 cap-and-trade 
system in the United States.  Although the bill never became law, it offers some insight into U.S. political 
preferences regarding linkage with other systems.  The bill would have allowed U.S. firms to use 
emissions allowances from foreign cap-and-trade systems, such as the EU ETS, but would have given the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency the option of establishing a limit on the percentage of a firm’s 
emissions that could be covered by such foreign allowances (H.R. 2454 at 722(d)3, 728).  The bill would 
also have allowed the use of both domestic and foreign (such as CDM) offset credits, with a combined 
quantitative limit of up two billion tons per year (compared with a total emissions cap of approximately 
five billion tons).  Starting in 2018, the bill would have applied an exchange rate of 1.25:1 when 
redeeming foreign offsets (H.R. 2454 at 722(d)1,721(e)). 
4  THE DURBAN PLATFORM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR LINKAGE 
A considerable number of linkages have been established or are likely to be established among 
regional, national, and sub-national tradable permit systems.  For better or worse, these linkages have 
been heavily influenced by the longstanding UNFCCC distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I 
responsibilities.  In particular, because the UNFCCC institutional framework has not encouraged 
developing countries to establish cap-and-trade systems, all links to developing countries have been 
through the CDM — an emission-reduction-credit system with flaws related to lack of full additionality.  
However, the Durban talks have opened up an opportunity for a new international framework that could 
employ linkage to engage developing countries, reduce the global costs of emissions reductions, and 
develop an institutional framework for a future top-down or bottom-up international climate policy 
architecture.  
14 
 
4.1 THE UNFCCC, THE BERLIN MANDATE, AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
Article 3 of the 1992 UNFCCC established a key principle:  “The Parties should protect the 
climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and 
in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. 
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof” (United Nations 1992, emphasis added).  The countries considered to be 
“developed country Parties” were listed in an appendix to the 1992 Convention (Annex I) which included 
the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) plus most of the 
emerging market economies of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
 
Three years after the Rio conference, at the first Conference of the Parties of the Framework 
Convention (COP-1) in Berlin, the global community agreed to the “Berlin Mandate” (United Nations 
1995).  This agreement developed a specific interpretation of “common but differentiated responsibilities” 
by establishing the dichotomous distinction whereby the Annex I countries are to take on emission-
reduction responsibilities, and the non-Annex I countries are to have no such responsibilities whatsoever. 
 
The Berlin Mandate, subsequently codified in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol via numerical national 
targets for a limited set of countries, had wide-ranging, worldwide consequences.  The dichotomous 
structure has driven up aggregate compliance costs to as much as four times their cost-effective level, 
because many opportunities for low-cost emissions abatement in emerging economies are taken off the 
table (Nordhaus 2008).  More problematic, an institutional structure was thereby put in place that makes 
change and progress exceptionally difficult, if not virtually impossible. 
4.2 A NEW APPROACH REQUIRING PARTICIPATION OF ALL PARTIES 
At the December 2011 UN talks in Durban, South Africa (COP-17), the international community 
agreed to a negotiating process focused on the long-term participation of all parties in the effort to 
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and combat climate change (United Nations 2011).  In particular, they 
adopted the goal of reaching an agreement by 2015 that will bring all nations under the same legal regime 
by 2020.  
 
This Durban Platform for Enhanced Action completely eliminates the Annex I/Non-Annex I (or 
industrialized/developing country) distinction.  Nowhere in the text of the decision will one find phrases 
such as “Annex I” or “historical responsibility,” which had long since become code words for emission 
targets applied exclusively to the richest countries.  
 
Negotiators from around the world now have a challenging task before them: to identify a new 
international climate policy architecture that is consistent with the process, pathway, and principles laid 
out in the Durban Platform, while still being consistent with the UN Framework Convention.  In other 
words, the challenge is to find a way to include all countries (or at least, the 20 largest national and 
regional economies that together account for upwards of 80% of global greenhouse gas emissions) in a 
structure that brings about meaningful emission reduction on an appropriate timetable at acceptable cost, 
while recognizing the different circumstances of nations in a way that is more subtle and sophisticated 
than the simple dichotomous distinction of years past.   
 
Although the Durban Platform opens up a window to a variety of promising international policy 
architectures,
20 its implications for architectures based on linkage are particularly important.  By lessening 
a key obstacle to the most meaningful international linkages – the absence of cap-and-trade systems in 
                                                      
20 See, for example:  Aldy and Stavins 2010; Posner and Weisbach 2010. 
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developing countries – the Durban Platform has improved the chances of future direct linkages among 
tradable permit systems in developed and developing countries.  Such linkages could serve a variety of 
roles in international climate policy architecture. 
5  LINKAGE AS A CLIMATE POLICY ARCHITECTURE 
We consider the role that linkage could play in international climate policy architecture.  Our 
examination is informed both by political interest in and economic experience with linkage.  The existing 
and planned links among regional, national, and sub-national climate change policies – as documented in 
Section 3 – provide preliminary evidence regarding both the near-term and long-term roles that linkage 
may play in global climate policy architecture. 
5.1 NEAR-TERM ROLE 
In the years since the ratification of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, a patchwork system of linkages has 
evolved among independent regional, national, and sub-national climate policies.  As described in above, 
the current set of existing and planned international links includes a number of direct connections:  links 
between trading systems in Europe, including the EU ETS, the EEA countries, and (most likely in 2014) 
Switzerland; the planned links among the members of the Western Climate Initiative, including the 
recently announced linkage between California and Quebec; and the planned link between the New 
Zealand ETS and Australia’s forthcoming cap-and-trade system.  Additionally, Australia and the EU are 
in negotiations to link their systems, a development that could create an indirect linkage between the EU 
ETS and New Zealand’s ETS.  Furthermore, the CDM and JI offset markets provide a strong indirect 
linkage between the European systems and the New Zealand ETS, and, depending on future allowance 
prices, could provide an indirect linkage to RGGI. 
 
This sample of existing and planned links hints at the outline of a near-term “system” that 
combines several regional, directly linked cap-and-trade systems, with some level of indirect connection 
via a common credit system, such as the CDM or a sectoral crediting program.  Until a specific 
international agreement is realized, such a bottom-up, decentralized system may become the de facto 
structure for near-term to medium-term international climate policy architecture.
21  
 
Such a de facto near-term system could play two roles.  First, it could provide economic benefits 
such as cost savings and market liquidity while (presumably) a future climate agreement is being 
negotiated.  Second, by helping to build an institutional framework of coordination among different 
systems, near-term linkage could help with the political transition to a robust long-term international 
climate policy architecture.  We discuss these roles in more detail in the following subsections. 
5.1.1  CAN LINKAGE PROVIDE NEAR-TERM COST SAVINGS AND MARKET LIQUIDITY? 
In the short term, linkage may provide two main economic contributions:  creating cost savings, 
and improving market liquidity and stability. As discussed in Section 2, the key economic rationale for 
linking two systems is to lower the aggregate costs of emissions reductions.  Because greenhouse gas 
emissions have the same effect on climate change regardless of where in the world they originate, linkage 
allows firms in high-cost systems to pay for less expensive abatement opportunities in lower-cost systems 
while still achieving the same overall environmental benefit.  Furthermore, because linkage increases the 
number of market participants available to buy and sell allowances and credits, it can thicken markets and 
reduce problems with price volatility. 
 
                                                      
21 The Durban Platform calls for an agreement to be reached by 2015 for implementation in 2020.  
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Experience suggests that direct linkages between cap-and-trade systems does in fact help to 
improve market functioning.  The best example of the economic benefits of direct linkage comes from the 
EU ETS.  Although allowance markets during the EU ETS trial phase showed signs of thinness, more 
recent trading periods have had higher volumes and greater efficiency (Montagnoli and de Vries 2010). 
 
However, although linkage can help with market functioning, the near-term cost savings from 
direct links between cap-and-trade systems may be modest.   Because two-way links are currently planned 
primarily between systems in highly developed nations, direct links may not be able to help regulated 
firms take advantage of very low-cost abatement opportunities (such as those available in developing 
countries).  Furthermore, direct linkages suffer from a climate policy irony:  the links that are most 
attractive for economic reasons — those between systems with very different allowance prices (such as 
RGGI and the EU ETS) — may be politically the most difficult to establish, because of the large 
international capital flows that such links would generate. 
 
Links with a credit system can also contribute to the near-term goals of cost-minimization and 
market liquidity.  In principle, a near-term set of indirect links could yield much of the cost savings and 
other advantages of a broad set of multilateral links.  This system of indirect links would preserve a high 
level of national control over domestic carbon markets, thus allowing countries to tailor policies to fit 
their specific political and economic circumstances. 
 
In practice, the ability of credit systems — in particular, the CDM — to create meaningful 
indirect links between cap-and-trade systems has been mixed.  On the positive side, allowance prices in 
the New Zealand ETS, which allows unlimited purchase of CDM offset credits, have been strongly 
influenced by developments in the CDM and the EU ETS (Reuters 2012).  However, despite the potential 
cost-savings from linking to a credit system, some cap-and-trade systems (such as in California and 
Quebec) have chosen to allow only selected external credits.  Others have imposed quantity limits on the 
use of external credits, have designed application procedures that make it difficult to receive approval for 
new offset projects, or have implemented trigger mechanisms that only allow the use of foreign offsets if 
domestic allowance prices exceed some pre-determined level.  This general reluctance to allow links with 
credit systems (in particular, with the CDM) is motivated by concerns about additionality, as well as an 
emphasis on achieving domestic emissions reductions.  Therefore, whether indirect links can improve the 
stability and cost-effectiveness of domestic carbon markets will depend largely on broader acceptance and 
use of credit systems such as the CDM. 
 
Although indirect linkage has clear benefits, it could also have destabilizing effects on offset 
markets in developing countries.  Such a situation could arise as the result of limits that many systems are 
placing on the use of external offset credits.  Consider a simple example, depicted in Figure 1, in which 
the world economy contains only two systems:  a cap-and-trade system, and an emission-reduction-credit 
system.  Suppose that the cap-and-trade system limits the number of offset credits that domestic entities 
can use for compliance, and that this limit is binding.  As a result, the ERC system will have an 
oversupply of emission reduction opportunities that would be profitable at current allowance prices, and 
the market for credits will fail to clear.  The situation is potentially even worse when there are two or 
more cap-and-trade systems with binding limits on the use of external offsets.  Because the market for 
offset credits will fail to clear, there will be multiple prices for credits, with prices depending on the 
allowance price in each separate cap-and-trade system.  In either case, the markets would face problems 
with transparency, and the resulting uncertainty could create substantial business risks that might drive up 
the costs of emissions reductions.  In particular, companies which make investments in offset projects 
would face the risk that they would be unable to sell their CERs at any price due to the binding limits on 
offset sales. 
 
How likely is such a scenario?  Table 1 summarizes limits on the use of offsets and credits for 
compliance in existing and planned systems.  The table shows, for example, that after 2013, credits may  
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make up no more than half of aggregate EU ETS emissions reductions.  Other systems have also imposed 
limits.  If nations pursue substantial emissions reduction goals while maintaining limits on offset credits, 
it is possible that limits on offsets will increasingly bind.  The current (May, 2012) discount of CER 
prices relative to EU ETS allowance prices suggests that this may already be happening.  
5.1.2  CAN LINKAGE PROVIDE A FOUNDATION FOR A FUTURE POLICY ARCHITECTURE? 
Although most of the ongoing discussions about potential linkages focus on the economic 
benefits of linking systems with different marginal abatement costs, linkage may provide an additional set 
of benefits, which are fundamentally political.  By helping to build an institutional framework of 
coordination among different systems, near-term linkage could help create a pathway to a robust long-
term international climate policy architecture.   
 
In the short term there will probably be several regional sets of directly linked systems, with some 
indirect linkage through the CDM or other offset/sectoral crediting programs.  Based on the limited 
political evidence available to date, this system may transition towards a system with greater numbers of 
two-way and multilateral direct links.  Such a system of linked cap-and-trade systems would preserve 
some national autonomy while requiring increased coordination of legislation, regulation, and institutions.  
Thus, in the same way that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade transitioned into the World Trade 
Organization, a bottom-up system of links could – in principle – provide the basic institutional framework 
for a broader climate agreement.  The creation of a broad set of links could generate not only experience 
but some degree of mutual trust among nations, and could supply at least a natural starting point for 
diplomatic negotiations. 
 
Of course, linkage could also create political and regulatory obstacles to a future agreement.  
Creating a linkage between two systems requires agreement about a variety of design characteristics, 
including the stringency of the cap in each system.  Because linkage can make it difficult for countries to 
change such design characteristics, it might make it more difficult for countries to make the adjustments 
necessary to support some future climate agreement. 
 
Linkage could help to support a future climate agreement in another way:  by providing participation 
incentives for nations to adopt market-based climate policies.  Major developed countries with cap-and-
trade systems may be expected to attempt to use offset programs as both a carrot and stick to stimulate 
developing country participation.   
 
The best example of this may be EU ETS policy towards CDM offsets from developing countries.  
Whereas between 2008 and 2012, the EU ETS allowed regulated entities to use CDM credits originating 
in any developing country, beginning in 2013, new CDM credits will only be allowed for projects 
originating in Least Developed Countries (thus excluding China and India).  This policy shift is 
deliberate:  recent EU documents state that “while initially the use of international credits was allowed for 
cost effective compliance, this has been complemented with the objective of actively using the leverage 
the EU possesses as the by far most important source of demand for international credits”
 (European 
Commission 2012c).  Furthermore, the EU ETS website states that the “EU has set out a vision for the 
development of an international carbon market: the market is expected to develop through bottom-up 
linking of compatible domestic cap-and-trade systems. An OECD-wide carbon market is expected by 
2015, which would be extended to include economically more advanced developing countries by 2020.  
New sectoral crediting mechanisms would be a stepping stone to cap and trade for these developing 
countries.”
22  Whether or not this EU linkage strategy will be effective is difficult to predict. 
                                                      
22 See:  http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/index_en.htm.  Accessed 5/28/2012. 
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5.1.3  OBSTACLES TO NEAR-TERM LINKAGE 
It is important to keep in mind that a variety of political, institutional, and economic factors will 
determine the types of links that are formed in the near future.  Recent political experience suggests that it 
has not been difficult to establish direct linkages between existing and planned cap-and-trade systems in 
developed countries.  However, these direct linkages are occurring primarily between jurisdictions that 
already have strong economic, political, and/or geographic ties. 
 
One obstacle to the establishment of additional direct links between cap-and-trade systems is the 
need to harmonize cost-containment measures and reach mutual agreement about emissions caps.  This 
may prove to be a particular challenge for a direct link between the EU ETS and North American cap-
and-trade systems.  For example, because California’s system includes an allowance reserve, and RGGI’s 
system includes a allowance price trigger for the use of additional offset credits, links to the EU ETS 
would result in automatic propagation of these cost control measures. 
 
An additional obstacle to direct linkage is the diversity of stringency across systems.  For 
example, a link between RGGI and the EU ETS is unlikely in the near future, given the current difference 
in allowance prices in the two systems ($1.93 per allowance in RGGI versus $8.53 per allowance in the 
EU ETS).
23  Such a link would result in large capital flows from Europe to the United States, and could be 
perceived as Europeans subsidizing lackluster U.S. ambition. 
 
Although the idea of linkage to a common credit system is also appealing, given that such a 
mechanism would not systems to harmonize design features, such linkage also faces some practical 
obstacles.  First, most existing and planned cap-and-trade systems have placed restrictions on the use of 
offset credits.   Table 1 summarizes these restrictions.  The table shows, for example, that although many 
EU ETS participants have had relatively generous limits on credits for the 2008-2012 compliance period, 
future limits will allow credits to make up no more than half of aggregate EU ETS emissions reductions 
after 2013.  Other systems have also imposed relatively low limits. 
 
Second, although the CDM is currently the world’s most important supplier of offset credits, it is 
not clear that it will continue in this role in the future.  Beginning in 2013, the EU ETS – the largest 
source of demand for offset credits – will only accept new offsets from CDM projects in Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs).  This requirement implies that China and India, which together have produced 68 
percent of CDM offsets to-date, will no longer be eligible to sell CERs into the European market.  What 
program or institution might replace the CDM is unknown.  Recent UN discussions have centered around 
the possibility of “New Market Mechanisms,” a vaguely defined set of sectoral crediting mechanisms that 
would require host country engagement and possibly emissions reduction commitments (International 
Emissions Trading Association 2012b).  Other jurisdictions, such as California’s AB 32 system, have 
begun developing other protocols for certifying emissions reduction credits from international sources.  
 
A third set of obstacles to indirect linkage via a credit system are the policy goals — espoused by 
many European countries — of achieving domestic emissions reductions and promoting investment in 
renewable energy sources.  Because allowing the use of credits has the effect of reducing allowance 
prices, linkage to a credit system (or even to a cap-and-trade system with a lower allowance price) 
reduces incentives for domestic firms to invest in renewable energy and other “green” technologies.  The 
desire to achieve this separate policy goal may create political opposition to linkage.  For example, 
European Commission documents reflect a clear concern that most emissions reduction be achieved 
domestically (European Parliament 2004, p.19; European Commission 2003, p.7-8; Kruger, Oats, and 
Pizer 2007, p.118).  Such emphasis was also exhibited in the Kyoto Protocol:  “The acquisition of 
emission reduction units shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes of meeting 
commitments” (United Nations 1998). 
                                                      
23 See http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/euets/ and   
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5.2 LONG-TERM ROLE 
In the long term, linkage could contribute to international climate policy architecture in at least 
two ways (Jaffe, Ranson, and Stavins 2009, p.803).  First, linkage could serve as an element of a broader 
international climate architecture.  In such a system, linkage might play several different roles.  In the 
short term, indirect linkages via a common credit system might serve as an implicit framework that would 
provide market liquidity and some cost savings, while still allowing nations to maintain control over 
domestic allowance markets.  In the longer term, nations might successfully negotiate a top-down climate 
agreement that specifies targets and timetables for emissions reductions.  Such an architecture might 
include a more comprehensive set of multilateral linkages between industrialized and developing 
countries that would allow nations to achieve more stringent emissions targets at lower aggregate cost.   
 
A second possibility is that a set of unilateral emissions commitments in a pledge-and-review 
system combined with a decentralized set of links could serve as a stand-alone, bottom-up architecture 
(Olmstead and Stavins 2012).  As discussed above, the near-term outlines of such an architecture may 
already be emerging, with regional trading partners choosing to link directly with each other, with broader 
indirect linkages via the CDM or new sectoral crediting mechanisms, and with the Copenhagen Accord 
(United Nations 2009) and the Cancun Agreements (United Nations 2011) providing a pledge-and-review 
system of essentially voluntary national targets.  As more jurisdictions establish cap-and-trade systems, 
this somewhat fragmented near-term system could evolve into a broader bottom-up architecture that 
includes a wide set of direct linkages. 
 
Whether such a decentralized architecture could achieve meaningful environmental results in a 
cost-effective manner depends on several factors.  First, a sufficient number of large emitters would have 
to agree to participate in the system.  Participation by industrialized countries would need to be self-
motivated, and there are a number of potential incentives that might induce developing countries to 
participate.  These include positive incentives (“carrots”), such as development assistance and the 
opportunity to sell allowances or offset credits, as well as negative incentives (“sticks”), such as carbon 
border adjustments or the imposition of graduation requirements as conditions for the opportunity to sell 
offset credits. 
 
Second, participating nations would have to commit to substantial unilateral emissions 
reductions.  In developed countries, these commitments would most likely be motivated by internal 
politics.  In developing countries, commitments would most likely depend on participation incentives 
provided by developed countries.  The emissions targets would either be decided unilaterally, or 
negotiated during the process of establishing and renewing direct linkages.  The set of voluntary 
commitments made thus far under the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements are probably 
insufficient for achieving the politically-endorsed international target of stabilizing greenhouse gas 
concentrations at 450 ppm CO2-equivalent (related to limiting average global warming to 2 degrees 
Centigrade) (Bosetti, Paltsev, Reilly, and Carraro 2011). 
 
Third and finally, for such an international policy architecture to be cost-effective, it would 
require links among GHG trading systems in industrialized and developing countries.  As discussed 
above, the near-term prospects for such a comprehensive set of links are mixed.  
6  CONCLUSION 
By replacing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s Berlin Mandate, 
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action has opened an important window.  National delegations from 
around the world now have a challenging task before them:  to identify by 2015 (for implementation in 
2020) a new international climate policy architecture that is consistent with the process, pathway, and 
principles laid out in the Durban Platform.  This will require finding a way to include all key countries in  
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a structure that brings about meaningful emissions reductions on an appropriate timetable at acceptable 
cost, while remaining within the overall framework and principles provided by the UNFCCC. 
 
On both a positive and normative basis, there is considerable attraction to bottom-up, 
decentralized international policy architectures.  Among these, the most promising may be linkage among 
tradable permit systems, whether in the form of a near-term, de facto architecture of organic linkages 
among regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, or in the form of a long-term 
replacement for the centralized, top-down architecture that characterizes the Kyoto Protocol.  The Durban 
Platform has improved the likelihood of establishing the types of developed-developing country linkages 
necessary to support these climate architectures.  
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Table 1: Summary of Limits on the Use of Offset Credits 
System Period  Limit  as  % 
of Cap 
Notes 
EU ETS  2013-  TBD  (a) 
EU ETS: Austria  2008-2012  10   
EU ETS: Belgium  2008-2012  8.4   
EU ETS: Czech Republic  2008-2012  10   
EU ETS: Estonia  2008-2012  0   
EU ETS: Finland  2008-2012  10   
EU ETS: France  2008-2012  13.5   
EU ETS: Hungary  2008-2012  10   
EU ETS: Germany  2008-2012  12   
EU ETS: Greece  2008-2012  9   
EU ETS: Ireland  2008-2012  10   
EU ETS: Italy  2008-2012  14.99   
EU ETS: Latvia  2008-2012  10   
EU ETS: Lithuania  2008-2012  20   
EU ETS: Luxembourg  2008-2012  10   
EU ETS: Malta  2008-2012  n/a   
EU ETS: Netherlands  2008-2012  10   
EU ETS: Poland  2008-2012  10   
EU ETS: Slovakia  2008-2012  7   
EU ETS: Slovenia  2008-2012  15.76   
EU ETS: Spain  2008-2012  20   
EU ETS: Sweden  2008-2012  10   
EU ETS: United Kingdom  2008-2012  8   
Swiss ETS  2008-  8   
New Zealand ETS  2008-  unlimited   
Australia’s Clean Energy Act  2012-  TBD  (b) 
RGGI 2009-  3.3  (c) 
California’s CAT system  2013-  8 or 0  (d) 
Quebec’s CAT system  2013-  8 or 0  (d) 
Notes:  (a) - The European Commission will choose a limit that 
allows credits to make up no more than 50% of emissions reductions.  
(b) From 2012 to 2015, the government may impose a fee of AUD$15 
to AUD$17 per credit.  (c) RGGI’s limit rises to 5% if allowance 
prices exceed $7, and to 10% if allowance prices exceed 
approximately $10.  (d) Neither California nor Quebec recognize 
offsets from UNFCCC flexibility mechanisms such as the CDM, 
although California has recently completed a MOA to allow 
deforestation credits from the states of Acre, Brazil, and Chiapas, 
Mexico. 
Sources:  See text above, and European Commission (2007c)  
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Figure 1: Allowance Market with Binding Limit on Offsets 
 
Legend:  D represents demand for emissions permits.  Sa and Sc 
represent the supply of domestic allowances and offset credits, 
respectively.  Qc represents the (binding) limit on offset sales.  Sa+c 
represents aggregate supply of allowances and offset credits.  Q
*
a 
and Q
*
c represent the number of allowances and credits that would 
be supplied at the market price P
*.   
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